What Medical Risks Should Physicians Disclose to their Patients? Towards a Better Standard in American and French Medical         Malpractice Law by Ciortea, Alina-Emilia
Journal of Civil Law Studies 
Volume 10 Number 1 Article 9 
12-31-2017 
What Medical Risks Should Physicians Disclose to their Patients? 
Towards a Better Standard in American and French Medical 
Malpractice Law 
Alina-Emilia Ciortea 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls 
 Part of the Civil Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Alina-Emilia Ciortea, What Medical Risks Should Physicians Disclose to their Patients? Towards a Better 
Standard in American and French Medical Malpractice Law, 10 J. Civ. L. Stud. (2017) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol10/iss1/9 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu. 
 
 
WHAT MEDICAL RISKS SHOULD PHYSICIANS DISCLOSE 
TO THEIR PATIENTS? TOWARDS A BETTER STANDARD IN 
AMERICAN AND FRENCH MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 
Alina-Emilia Ciortea∗ 
Introduction ................................................................................. 175 
I. The Standard of Disclosure in the United States ..................... 178 
A. Origins of the Doctrine of Informed Consent ................. 178 
B. Contemporary Development: The Standard of                 
     Disclosure ....................................................................... 181 
1. The Professional Standard .......................................... 184 
2. The Prudent Patient Standard...................................... 187 
         a. The Objective Patient-Based Standard ................... 187 
         b. The Subjective Patient-Based Standard ................. 191 
II. The Standard of Disclosure in France .................................... 193 
A. What is the Legal Basis for the Duty to Inform? ............ 196 
B. The Patient’s Right to Information ................................. 198 
C. The Duty to Disclose Before the Patients’ Rights Law                   
     of March 4, 2002 ............................................................ 200 
D. The Duty to Disclose After the Law of March 4, 2002 .. 201 
III. Suggested Alternative Standards .......................................... 204 
A. Injecting Objectiveness into the Substantive                             
     Patient-Based Standard ................................................... 205 
B. Shared Medical Decision-Making .................................. 210 




                                                                                                             
 ∗   Ph.D. candidate, Babeș-Bolyai University, Faculty of Law, Cluj-
Napoca, Romania; LL.M. (May 2015) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana 
State University; member, Cluj Bar Association. 







This essay discusses the historical and evolutionary back-
ground of the doctrine of informed consent in medical malpractice 
cases in order to provide the reader with a detailed and a unique 
comparative perspective of the law in the United States and in 
France, along with some cross-references to other legal systems 
across the globe.  
In order to achieve the desired goal, this paper conducts the 
analysis based on a hypothetical situation. Starting from these 
facts, the paper shows how and if the American and the French 
standards addressing the scope of the physician’s duty to disclose 
the risks intrinsic to the procedure draw a proper balance between 
the two conflicting interests (i.e., the patient and the physician).   
Keeping in mind that the principles of medical ethics and hu-
man rights should guide the legal development of the doctrine of 
informed consent, it is proposed, in a non-exhaustive manner, that 
the addition of two alternative legal standards of disclosure: a 
“mixed standard” that should embrace into tort law the notion of 
error, as vice of consent, and the shared-medical decision-making, 
which involves engaging both the physician and the patient in the 
process of deciding on the medical treatment or procedure. These 
innovative solutions protect the patient’s ability to obtain the in-
formation necessary for an intelligent decision and, at the same 
time, provide the physician with a clear understanding of what 
necessary information should be disclosed in order to avoid liabil-
ity based on the doctrine of informed consent. 
 
Keywords: medical malpractice, doctrine of informed consent, 
comparative law, information disclosure, American law, French 











“Had I known about the risks, I would have made another 
choice, but nobody told me. How could I have guessed?” As fre-
quent as this situation might be, it is undeniable that it can be a 
painful experience when connected to a medical choice.  
Think of the following scenario: while cleaning his home on 
Saturday, Paul fell down and injured his right wrist. Though he is 
in pain, he is reluctant to run to the emergency room during the 
weekend. On Monday morning, he seeks medical assistance at the 
Municipal Hospital, where his arm is x-rayed. Dr. Medicus, the 
orthopedist, tells Paul that his wrist is broken. “You have two op-
tions,” he says. “We can put this hand on a splint or you can have 
surgery. If you choose not to have surgery, you must rest this hand 
in a horizontal position for at least four weeks.” Dr. Medicus ex-
plains that if Paul chooses surgery, the hand will cure faster, 
though it might be more painful. Paul does not worry about pain 
(there are painkillers) but cares about mobility. He decides to have 
the surgery. Dr. Medicus performs the surgery, apparently success-
fully, but Paul does not recover completely, even with physiother-
apy, he keeps some stiffness in one finger. He goes back to Dr. 
Medicus, who admits that this is a rare outcome of the procedure 
but not a usual risk. “Still, you could have told me of the risk,” 
says Paul. “Well, this is such an unusual development. If I told my 
patients of all these unusual risks, they would grow such anxiety 
that they would not survive the anesthesia. I am afraid you will 
have to live with this finger stiffness, which should not bother you 
too much unless you are a pianist . . . .” 
Dr. Medicus lost his good humor hearing Paul tell him that his 
second job was to play the piano in the local orchestra.  
Should Dr. Medicus be held liable for failure to disclose the 
unusual risk? Should he have guessed that his patient might have 
been a pianist on the sole account of him having fine hands? As 




part of the conversation, did the parties have an opportunity to 
properly discuss what was at stake, including lifestyle?  
All western legal systems are facing these questions, whether 
they are civil law or common law jurisdictions. Some systems may 
have it as an issue of tort law; others may consider it under con-
tract law. All of the above will be embraced in this paper.  
The standard of disclosure will be explored in two leading 
common law and civil law jurisdictions: The United States (part I) 
and France (part II) in order to provide a broad understanding of 
the doctrine of informed consent1 in a comparative manner.2 One 
may wonder why the United States and France?  
Firstly, in the United States, one of the leading jurisdictions of 
the common law world, several standards of disclosure have been 
identified. Some states3 give physicians large discretion in choos-
ing the medical procedure, and as a result the patient’s autonomy is 
severely diminished. In other states, even if the patient has a cer-
tain voice, his right of self-determination is not well-protected as it 
is generally assumed that all patients in similar circumstances as-
sess identically the risks and benefits of a medical procedure. 
Whether the actual standards of disclosure respond to the needs of 
the contemporary American society is a dilemma that has its roots 
in a variety of frameworks, including the ethical and juridical un-
derpinnings of the doctrine of informed consent. 
Secondly, in France, a jurisdiction all too famous for its semi-
nal Civil Code, the doctrine of informed consent has evolved grad-
ually and consistently, though not by a Civil Code reform. 
                                                                                                             
 1. A definition of the doctrine of informed consent explains it as “a negli-
gent concept predicated on the duty of the physician to disclose to a patient in-
formation that will enable him to ‘evaluate knowledgeable the options available 
and the risks attendant upon each’ before subjecting the patient to a course of 
treatment.” See Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 438 (1983). 
 2. The following part will focus mainly on the development of the physi-
cian’s duty to inform the patient in these two jurisdictions, but some references 
to other countries will be made as well in order to enhance the comparative ap-
proach. 
 3. For example, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Maine, 
Nevada, New York.  




Courts had to step in: the Cour de cassation ruled, in 1998, that 
the physician must inform the patient about the serious risks of a 
medical procedure and the treatment proposed and that this duty 
exists even if the serious risks occur only in exceptional cases.4 
What did lawmakers mean by “serious risks” in 1998? What is to 
be understood by that phrase nowadays? What are the differences 
and similarities between the French standard and the standards ap-
plied in the United States?  
It is known that the duty to disclose, implicitly its scope, that 
rests upon the physician has developed gradually in the United 
States, as well as in France, in order to meet the evolution of socie-
ty. This paper discusses the historical and evolutionary background 
in order to provide the reader with a detailed and unique compara-
tive perspective of the doctrine of informed consent by highlight-
ing that the current standards of disclosure might not be sufficient-
ly evolved to meet the needs of contemporary society.  
To achieve the desired goal, based on the hypothetical situation 
above-mentioned, this paper will show that as society has changed 
over the last few years in the United States, as well as in France, 
the patient’s autonomy has become a valuable health care resource. 
Therefore, the choice of treatment must be the result of a compro-
mise between the patient’s autonomy and the physician’s obliga-
tion to act with beneficence toward the patient. The outcome con-
sists of a communication in which the patient and the physician are 
directly and personally engaged. Hence, part III will focus mainly 
on discussing two alternative and innovative solutions in order to 
adequately protect the patient’s ability to obtain the information 
necessary for an intelligent decision and, at the same time, provide 
the physician with a clear understanding of what necessary infor-
                                                                                                             
 4. Cass. Civ. 1, 7 October 1998, Bull. Civ. I, no. 287, at 291; JCP 1998, 
11, 10179 (concl. J. Sainte-Rose, note P. Sargos). 




mation should be disclosed in order to avoid liability based on the 
doctrine of informed consent.5  
Though we are aware that the patient may also bring criminal 
or disciplinary actions against the physician, the paper will focus 
on civil liability. It will not address the issue of whether the hospi-
tal has a (non) duty to obtain the patient’s consent. The focus will 
be on the duty that the physician has to the patient involved in a 
medical procedure. This paper will only refer to the informed con-
sent of legally competent patients, in normal circumstances of clin-
ical care and not in emergency situations. 
I. THE STANDARD OF DISCLOSURE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Origins of the Doctrine of Informed Consent  
In the United States, two major legal adjustments have been 
made to meet the needs of an evolving medical system. In the past, 
a patient who had been the victim of injury by physicians could file 
a civil battery lawsuit.6 Battery is defined as “an intentional tort 
that protects a person’s interest in being free from physical contact 
                                                                                                             
 5. We are not of the opinion that the physician should have indefinite dis-
cretion in making a choice for the patient’s treatment (as it was considered under 
the traditional paternalistic approach. For instance, for a presentation of this ap-
proach in the Israeli legal system, see Yehiel S. Kaplan, The right of a Minor in 
Israel to Participate in the Decision-Making Process Concerning His or Her 
Medical Treatment, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1085, 1086-87 (2002). Therefore, it 
is mandatory to impose a standard, whether a judicial or a legislative one, in 
order to consolidate the “partnership” between the physician and the patient. See 
Leonard J. Nelson III, in 5 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 22.04 (David W. Louisell 
& Harold Willians eds. 2016). The traditional paternalistic approach can be seen 
in Romanian law as well: see Emese Florian, Discuții în legătură cu 
răspunderea civilă a personalului medical pentru neîndeplinirea obligației 
privitoare la consimțământul informat al pacientului, 8 DREPTUL 30, 31 (2008) 
(Ro.).  
 6. See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 14-16 (Minn. 1905). In this case, 
the patient consented to an operation on her right ear. During the surgery, the 
physician considered that the left ear should be the one operated because it was 
in a more serious condition and proceeded with the operation on the left ear on-
ly. The patient sued the surgeon for the tort of assault and battery based on the 
theory of lack of consent. The court awarded damages to the patient because she 
gave no consent to the surgery on the left ear, thus the operation was unlawful. 




with his or her person.”7 Historically, this course of action was 
taken due to the fact that the physician failed to obtain the patient’s 
consent to an invasive course of treatment,8 because it was con-
tended that “[t]he physician’s need to obtain the consent of the pa-
tient to surgery derived from the patient’s right to reject a noncon-
sensual touching.”9 Therefore, battery was the proper and the effi-
cient cause of action for the protection of the patient’s interest in 
being free from unconsented touching.10 The real focus in these 
early cases was on the right to bodily integrity, rather than on self-
determination.11  
To conclude, the common law world faced with practical situa-
tions in which the physician failed to inform the patient about the 
risks of a certain medical procedure, had to find an equitable solu-
tion for the innocent victim. Wisely using the juridical tools that 
were available at a certain point in the past, and with the awareness 
that the law evolves empirically in the United States, the courts 
decided that, for the time, battery was the appropriate cause of ac-
tion.12  
Judge Cardozo’s opinion in Schloendorff v. Society of New 
York Hospitals13 adopted a slightly different view and stated that: 
“[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has the right 
to determine what shall be done with his own body.” Thus, the ac-
cent was not placed so much on the unwanted touching (meaning 
                                                                                                             
 7. FRANK L. MARAIST ET. AL., TORT LAW: THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA 
PERSPECTIVES 25 (2d ed. 2015). The United States maintains the old boundary 
between intentional torts and negligence. See also id. at 15. Battery, assault, 
false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass to land, 
trespass to chattel etc. are, in a common law jurisdiction, included in the catego-
ry of intentional torts, viewed as a tort theory of recovery for the innocent plain-
tiff against the intentional tortfeasor.  
 8. Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 456 (1999). 
 9. Id. at 460. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Jaime S. King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: 
The Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 429, 438 
(2006). 
 12. Matthies, 733 A.2d at 460. 
 13. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 
1914) (surgeon performing an operation without the patient’s consent).  




the lack of consent), which is the very essence of the battery, but 
rather on the violation of the bodily integrity.14 Courts noticed that 
equity requires imposing liability upon physicians, and because the 
doctrine of informed consent was not yet adopted, the cause of ac-
tion of battery was a practical alternative. Moreover, generally, 
physicians did not have the requisite intention to harm patients; 
rather they failed to provide the necessary information “in the rela-
tively good faith for the benefit of the patient.”15 Being so, a shift 
from battery to negligence standard was definitely needed.16  
Later, under the theory of negligence, the doctrine of informed 
consent may hold the physician liable “regardless of whether the 
injuries were the consequence of negligence or otherwise.”17 Neg-
ligence is defined as follows: “a conduct which falls below the 
standard established by law for the protection of others against un-
reasonable risk of harm. It does not include conduct recklessly dis-
regardful of an interest of others.”18  
The doctrine of informed consent requires that, in the absence 
of an emergency, the physician must inform the patient about: “(1) 
                                                                                                             
 14. Id.; the court, in this case, just wanted to impose an absolute duty on 
physicians to inform patients of what was going to be done. JAY KATZ, THE 
SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 49, 52 (2002). This right was not broad 
enough as it encompassed only the right of refusal. However, the case “neither 
invited nor required a sophisticated examination of the relationship between 
disclosure and consent on one hand, and self-determination, on the other.” This 
approach was “still decades away.”  
 15. Id. at 68.  
 16. Courts have recognized that “the need for patient’s consent is better 
understood as deriving from the right of self-determination” rather than an unau-
thorized touching or bodily integrity. See, e.g., Matthies, 733 A.2d at 460. See 
also KATZ, supra note 14, at 69. Jay Katz, an American physician and a law 
professor, stated a number of reasons why, ordinarily, judges have rejected the 
theory of battery. Firstly, the inexistence of many defences as a remedy to bat-
tery, which might put the physician in a vulnerable position. Secondly, actual 
medical practice, rather than a judicial theory, is taken into account by judges in 
order to form the legal standard. Thirdly, the theory of negligence will help phy-
sicians liable only for failure to disclose information that would have been pro-
vided by other physicians. Last, but not least, the patient in a negligence claim 
will have a higher burden of proof to make sure no frivolous claims are filed.  
 17. Housh v. Morris, 818 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).  
 18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (A.L.I. 1979) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT]. 




the diagnosis; (2) the general nature of the contemplated proce-
dure; (3) the risks involved; (4) the prospects of success; (5) the 
prognosis if the procedure is not performed; and (6) alternative 
medical treatments.”19  
These broad requirements do not offer a clear and certain 
standard as to what type of risks the duty to disclose extends. In the 
interest of finding out the sphere of coverage of this duty and ac-
cordingly the correlative interest of the patient to be informed, we 
will have to use the adjustable legal microscope and examine the 
“plate” consisting of case law and legislation from different states 
in the United States.  
B. Contemporary Development: The Standard of Disclosure 
Most states have generally adopted the negligence theory of the 
doctrine of informed consent.20 Thus, the patient has a distinct 
cause of action21 under the doctrine of informed consent.22 Still, 
there are also states in which the action for lack of consent is treat-
ed as an action based on battery.23  
                                                                                                             
 19. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.04 (citing Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., 896 
A.2d 777, 778 (2006)).  
 20. For details, see Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.11.  
 21. Swiss law is another example in which the action for failure to obtain 
informed consent is a distinct cause of action. See Corrine Widmer Lüchinger, 
Medical Liability in Switzerland, in MEDICAL LIABILITY IN EUROPE: A 
COMPARISON OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS 547, 579 (Bernhard A. Koch ed. 
2011).   
 22. See, e.g., Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2010) 
(quoting Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 111 n.4 (Wyo. 1989)): “While battery 
still ‘remains applicable where a treatment or procedure was completely unau-
thorized . . . negligence principles [now] apply to the more often encountered 
situation where the treatment or procedure was authorized but the consent was 
uninformed.’” 
 23. Pennsylvania is an example of such a jurisdiction. See Pomroy v. Hosp. 
of the Univ. of Pa., 105 A.3d 740 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). Courts decided that 
“[t]here is no cause of action in Pennsylvania for negligent failure to gain in-
formed consent” by referring to Kelly v. Methodist Hospital, 664 A.2d 148, 150 
(Pa. Super. 1995). It was also decided that “[l]ack of informed consent is the 
legal equivalent to no consent” (quoting Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 798 
A.2d 742, 748 (Pa. 2002)). 




Without ignoring the states that treat lack of consent as a bat-
tery claim, the focus of this paper will be on the right of action for 
negligence.24 Hence, liability will be imposed if, before engaging 
into a medical procedure, the physician fails to provide sufficient 
relevant information in order to enable the patient to give his “in-
telligent consent.”25 In Salgo, a 55 year-old man consulted Dr. 
Gerbode, a specialist in the surgical treatment of arterial diseases, 
because he complained about severe cramping pains in his legs.26 
Dr. Gerbode told the patient that his circulatory situation was quite 
serious, but he did not explain to the plaintiff all of the various 
possibilities of the proposed procedures.27 The physician per-
formed an aortography procedure, which departed, at that time, 
from the standard of care.28 The surgery went well, but on the fol-
lowing day, both of his legs were in an irreversible paralyzed con-
dition.29 The court in this case did not clarify the standard of care 
that should be imposed.30 After ruling, Judge Bray stated that “a 
physician violates his duty to the patient and subjects himself to 
liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the 
basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treat-
ment;”31 and he granted discretion to the physicians regarding the 
necessary facts about which proper information must be given.32 
What are the elements of a prima facie case in the common law 
negligence theory? The plaintiff, i.e., the patient, is required to 
                                                                                                             
 24. The theory of battery applies nowadays to situations in which the medi-
cal procedure was performed without the consent of the patient. See Pizzalotto v. 
Wilson, 437 So. 2d 859, 863 (La. 1983): “Thus, an unauthorized operation that 
is skillfully performed still constitutes a battery.” See also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 
P.2d 1, 8 (1972): “The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances 
when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient has not consented.” 
 25. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 317 P.2d 
170, 181 (1957). 
 26. Id. at 173. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 181. 
 32. Id. 




prove as part of the prima facie case: the existence of a duty, a 
breach of that duty, proximate cause or causation, and injury.33  
Regarding causation, the patient has to prove that the physician’s 
failure to provide the requisite information was the proximate 
cause of the patient’s injuries34 and that the patient would have re-
fused to undergo the medical procedure had the information been 
disclosed.35 
Without any intent of minimizing the importance of the other 
elements of a lawsuit based on lack of informed consent, this paper 
will focus on the criteria used to measure the physician’s duty to 
disclose information to the patient.  
Generally, the standard of care requires physicians to “inform a 
patient of the dangers of, possible negative consequences of, and 
alternatives to a proposed treatment or procedure.”36 However, 
how is this abstract standard measured in concreto? 
In the United States, there are two major lines of cases address-
ing the scope of the physician’s duty to disclose the risks inherent 
in medical procedures.37  
The traditional negligence standard, known also as the “profes-
sional standard,”38 is mainly opened to the wisdom and the practi-
cal experience of the physicians. Hence, one may say that the pa-
tient’s autonomy is not well protected. Are there valid arguments 
to contradict or sustain this statement? How did doctrinal criticism 
contribute to the development of the doctrine of informed consent?  
In recent years, many states have alternatively adopted a new 
standard, known as the “prudent patient standard.”39 Does the new 
standard adequately protect the patient’s interests? What are the 
predictions for the evolution of this saga? Does this new standard 
                                                                                                             
 33. 70 C.J.S. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS § 122, 1 (2015). See also 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, at § 281-282.  
 34. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 440.  
 35. Id. at 441.  
 36. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 440. 
 37. Id. at 439-45. 
 38. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.05.  
 39. Id. 




indicate the end of the old controversy or the beginning of a new 
paradigm?   
1. The Professional Standard 
The professional standard40 states that the physician’s duty is 
determined by the prevailing practice in the community. The ques-
tion is as follows: what would a reasonable physician disclose to a 
patient under similar circumstances?41  
This standard, also known as the “professional theory,”42 has 
been adopted in many states whether judicially (see for example: 
Arizona,43 Arkansas,44 Colorado,45 Indiana,46 Maine,47 Nevada,48 
North Carolina,49 Texas,50 Virginia,51 Wyoming52) or by statute53 
(see for instance: Florida,54 Nebraska,55 New York,56 and Ver-
mont57).  
When a patient files a lawsuit for breach of informed consent, 
as part of the prima facie case, the plaintiff has to establish the ex-
istence of a duty on the part of the physician. This can be achieved 
                                                                                                             
 40. Justice Schroeder expressed a rationale for this approach. See Natanson 
v. Kline, 350 P.2d. 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960).  
 41. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.05.  
 42. Curran v. Buser, 271 Neb. 332, 711 N.W.2d 562 (2006). 
 43. McGrady v. Wright, 729 P.2d 338 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). 
 44. Brumley v. Naples, 896 S.W.2d 860, 864 (1995); Fuller v. Starnes, 597 
S.W.2d 88 (1980). 
 45. Gorab v. Zook, 943 P.2d 423, 428 (Colo. 1997). 
 46. Spar v. Cha, 907 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 2009). 
 47. Ouellette v. Mehalic, 534 A.2d 1331 (Me. 1988). 
 48. Bronneke v. Rutherford, 89 P.3d 40, 45-46 (Nev. 2004); Smith v. Cot-
ter, 810 P.2d 1204 (1991). 
 49. Starnes v. Taylor, 158 S.E.2d 339 (1968). 
 50. Sherrill v. McBride, 603 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App. 1980). 
 51. Tashman v. Gibbs, 556 S.E.2d 772, 778-779 (2001). 
 52. Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989); Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 
1244, 1255 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 53. There are jurisdictions in which the legal requirements of the doctrine of 
informed consent have been developed in case law as well as in statute. See, 
e.g., for Sweedish law, Lüchinger, supra note 21, at 547, 579.  
 54. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103 (West 2012). 
 55. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2816 (2014). 
 56. N.Y. Pub. Health L. § 2805-d(1) (2014). 
 57. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909(a)(1) (2014). 




by proof that a “reasonable prudent practitioner” acting in the phy-
sician’s position, would have provided additional information. As 
the physician failed to disclose sufficient relevant information to 
the patient, he breached his duty.  
How the physician discharges his obligation to inform the pa-
tient is “primarily a question of medical judgment.”58 Therefore, 
the courts held that the patient has to prove that a professional cus-
tom exists (hence, the defendant’s departure from that standard) by 
relying on medical expert testimony.59 The rationale for this ap-
proach: establishing that a physician breached his duty is rarely 
“sufficiently obvious as to lie within common knowledge.”60 
The professional standard is said to have two main justifica-
tions.61 Firstly, because disclosure of the risks is regarded as a pro-
fessional judgment, it is contended that the physician is in the best 
position to estimate the effects of the disclosure of certain risks on 
the patient.62 Secondly, the physician cannot afford to waste time 
in order to inform the patient about every possible risk to protect 
himself from liability.63 
Courts have criticized the professional standard because it pro-
vides unlimited discretion to the physician.64 Furthermore, some 
object that the standard “undercuts the value of autonomy”65 of the 
patient, which stands as one of the foundations of the doctrine of 
informed consent.66  
What would be the result if the professional standard was ap-
plied to the hypothetical case presented above? If the physician 
                                                                                                             
 58. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d. 1093, 1106 (1960). 
 59. See, e.g., Copenhaver v. Miller, 537 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2d Dist. 1989) (citing Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Valcin, 507 So.2d 
596 (Fla. 1987)). 
 60. Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1130 (Me. 1980) (citing Cox v. 
Dela Cruz, 406 A.2d 620, 622 (Me. 1979)). 
 61. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.04.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  
 64. See Cobbs, 502 P.2d 1, 10.  
 65. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.04.  
 66. Id.  




does not have knowledge of the patient’s preferences and lifestyle, 
then it is more probable than not, taking into consideration the cas-
es discussed in this section, that the custom in the medical field 
would have dictated that the physician, Dr. Medicus, did not have 
the duty to disclose the risk of nerve damage. This is because it 
represented a minor risk to the medical community and it was too 
remote in regard to the medical procedure performed. For example, 
there are many serious risks associated with a medical invasive 
procedure that are required, by the medical custom, to be dis-
closed: infections, bleeding, side effects to anesthesia, etc. Disclos-
ing every single risk of the procedure, regardless of how remote 
and unlikely it is to occur, would likely result in constant refusal of 
treatment. Such behavior of the patients is not desirable in a mod-
ern and developed society. However, in case the patient communi-
cates his preferences and lifestyle, then the physician might be un-
der customary obligation to disclose even the unusual risks associ-
ated with the information provided by the patient. Taking into ac-
count that Paul, due to anxiety and stress, might not have commu-
nicated efficiently his preferences, it is difficult to say whether Dr. 
Medicus would have disclosed the risk of stiffness of one finger. 
Whereas this standard protects the physician from liability, it does 
not provide an adequate tool for the respect of the patient’s auton-
omy. However, even if Paul informed Dr. Medicus about his sec-
ond job as a pianist, it would be very hard for the plaintiff to prove 
the existence of a professional custom (admitting that such custom 
exists), which would impose on the physician the disclosure of 
such risks. Should society, i.e., the policy makers and the judges, 
allow such unfairness? Perhaps this was one of the reasons that the 









2. The Prudent Patient Standard  
Under the prudent patient standard, the physician’s duty to dis-
close is determined by the information needs of a prudent patient 
in similar circumstances.67 The patient’s needs are “the infor-
mation material to his decision”68 to undergo a proposed therapy.  
The plaintiff is not required to present expert testimony in or-
der to establish a professional standard69 (under the duty element), 
as part of the prima facie case.70 Consequently, the patient must 
show that “the probability of the type of harm is a risk which a rea-
sonable person would consider in deciding on treatment”71 or the 
jury must determine, based on the “credibility of the plaintiff’s tes-
timony”72 whether he would have refused the treatment, had he 
been informed about the risks of the medical procedure.73 Corre-
spondingly, the determination of materiality is a question for the 
trier of fact and does not require expert testimony.74  
In order to determine whether particular information is material 
to the decision of the patient, the courts have utilized two stand-
ards: the objective or the subjective patient-based standard.75 
a. The Objective Patient-Based Standard 
In 1972, the courts of the United States elaborated a new stand-
ard—the prudent patient objective standard—in two landmark cas-
es. 
                                                                                                             
 67. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.05.  
 68. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 69. For the need of the elimination of expert testimony with respect to the 
standard of care, see Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783. 
 70. Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.04.  
 71. Britt v. Taylor, 852 So. 2d 1128, 1135 (La. Ct. App. 2003).  
 72. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979).  
 73. Id.  
 74. Marsingill v. O'Malley, 128 P.3d 151, 158 (Alaska 2006). However, we 
have to stress that there is still a need for expert medical testimony with regard 
to the “existence and nature of the risk as well as the likelihood of its occur-
rence.” See Nelson, supra note 5, at §22.04.  
 75. Id. at §22.05.  




This approach was firstly adopted in Canterbury v. Spence.76 
The facts presented a nineteen-year old boy who had experienced 
severe pain between his shoulder blades.77 The patient underwent 
surgery.78 A day after the operation, the lower half of his body was 
paralyzed and he had to be operated.79 However, he remained para-
lyzed in the bowel region and had urinal incontinence.80 The plain-
tiff contended that the physician had failed to perform his duty to 
inform him about any risk of paralysis from the procedure.81 He 
brought a negligence suit, claiming that the physician failed to dis-
close the risks necessary to allow the patient to make an informed 
consent relating to the medical procedure.82 Judge Robinson ques-
tioned the feasibility of the professional standard, and reached the 
conclusion that it had to be replaced with another standard that will 
give patients a larger role in determining whether to undergo a cer-
tain medical procedure.83 
According to the objective patient-based standard, the scope of 
the standard is “not subjective as to either the physician or the pa-
tient.”84 The test whether a particular risk must be disclosed to the 
patient is “its materiality to the patient’s decision,”85 meaning that 
all risks that might influence the decision must be revealed.86 The 
materiality of the standard is defined as what “a reasonable person, 
in what physician knows or should know to be the patient’s posi-
tion, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster the 
risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy.”87  
                                                                                                             
 76. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 772.  
 77. Id. at 776.  
 78. Id. at 777. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 778. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 786. 
 84. Id. at 787.  
 85. Id. at 786.  
 86. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 442.  
 87. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 (quoting Jon R. Waltz & Tomas W. 
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 NW. U.L. REV. 628, 639-40 
(1970)). 




The court in Canterbury expressed the need for a change with 
respect to the standard of disclosure. Firstly, it held that “the pa-
tient’s right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to 
reveal.”88 Secondly, the court finds “formidable obstacles”89 to 
accept that the duty to disclose is limited by the custom in the med-
ical practice.90 To sustain this statement, Judge Robinson contend-
ed that “a professional consensus on communication of option and 
risk information to patients is open to serious doubt.”91 Moreover, 
the court acknowledged the deficiency of the professional standard 
that “physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.”92 In 
conclusion, the court calls for a “standard set by law rather than 
one which physicians may or may not impose upon themselves”93 
in order to respect the patient’s right of self-determination.94  
Then, Canterbury v. Spence was followed by Cobbs v. Grant.95 
The facts in this case suggest that a patient had his spleen removed 
after it had been injured in a previous surgery that was performed 
because of the plaintiff’s duodenal ulcer.96 The plaintiff filed a suit 
claiming that the physician failed to disclose the inherent risk of 
the initial surgery, which led the patient to give a “vitiated con-
sent” to the procedure.97 The court held that “an objective test is 
preferable: i.e., what would a prudent person in the patient’s posi-
tion have decided if adequately informed of all significant per-
ils.”98 
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 93. Id. 
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 95. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229 (1972).  
 96. Id. at 234.  
 97. Id. at 235.   
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This standard was aimed at protecting the patient’s autonomy99 
and, at the same time, at assuring that physicians are not exposed 
to “the whims and idiosyncrasies of individual patients.”100 How-
ever, the objective patient-based standard assumes that all patients 
assess the risks and benefits of a medical procedure similarly,101 
which is obviously far from true.102  
Moreover, in Canterbury, Judge Robinson distinguishes be-
tween “the special and general standard aspects of the physician-
patient relationship”103 for the purpose of the duty to disclose. On 
the one hand, when a physician has to make a medical judgment 
(in which case the special standard controls), the court in Canter-
bury gives “great deference to the physicians’ decisions.”104 On the 
other hand, the court does not give further indication on how medi-
cal judgment is defined or what criteria should be used in order to 
distinguish between medical and non-medical judgments.105 Then, 
we ask ourselves: did the law really get to the point where the self-
determination of the patient is well protected and the physician is 
given rigorous standards to rely on in order to avoid medical liabil-
ity? Maybe some more steps need to be taken.  
Applying the objective patient-based standard to the hypothet-
ical, the plaintiff will not be required to prove, by medical experts, 
the existence of a standard of care. However, even if the burden of 
proof seems to be lighter, a reasonable person would be unlikely to 
                                                                                                             
 99. However, there is also an opposite opinion expressed in the doctrine. 
See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 14, at 76.  
 100. See King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 443, 458. Although the physi-
cian might seem to be protected if the objective patient-based standard is ap-
plied, such a conclusion might be deceitful. There are some difficulties on the 
part of the physician to know a priori what does a reasonable patient expect to 
be informed about before he gives his consent to a medical procedure. Thus, 
“the idea that all physicians and patients drew the same bright lines distinguish-
ing those ‘material’ risks from ‘immaterial’ risks is misleading.”  
 101. Id. at 443.  
 102. See KATZ, supra note 14, at 76: “The belief that there is one ‘reasona-
ble’ or ‘prudent’ response to every situation inviting medical intervention is 
nonsense, from the point of view of both the physician and the patient.”  
 103. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 785. 
 104. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 443.  
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attach so much significance to the minor loss of the finger’s mobil-
ity. For Paul, the patient who plays in the local orchestra, the un-
wanted outcome of the procedure affects his life, thus the risk of 
loss of mobility would have been, for him, a relevant one, that 
should have been disclosed by the physician prior to the procedure. 
Under these facts, if the patient would file a suit, it is likely that he 
would not receive compensation because the physician did not 
breach the standard of care established on the basis of a reasonable 
patient. A reasonable patient might have placed more importance 
on the element of fast recovery, rather than on the particular risk 
that was not disclosed. Hence, this example shows that there are no 
black or white risks, but in lieu that the “risks exist only in shades 
of grey.”106  
b. The Subjective Patient-Based Standard 
In 1979, in Scott v. Bradford,107 Justice Doolin of the Oklaho-
ma Supreme Court established a subjective patient-based standard, 
which was aimed at enhancing the patient’s autonomy, as “the law 
does not permit a physician to substitute his judgment for that of 
the patient by any form of artifice.”108  
Under a subjective patient-based standard, the physicians could 
be held negligent for failing to obtain an informed consent if the 
plaintiff is able to prove that knowing the material risks would 
have made him refuse to undergo the medical procedure.109 Hence, 
the material risk is the one that would “be likely to affect a pa-
tient’s decision.”110 
                                                                                                             
 106. Id. at 449 (citing August Piper, Jr., Truce on the Battlefield: A proposal 
for a Different Approach to Medical Informed Consent, 22 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
301, 303).  
 107. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 556 (Okla. 1979). The facts of the case 
state that the plaintiff’s wife underwent surgery for removal of the uterine tu-
mors that she had developed. The plaintiff contended that the physician did not 
disclose the risks involved or available alternatives to surgery.  
 108. Id.  
 109. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 443.  
 110. Scott, 606 P.2d at 558. 




The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the “reasonable patient 
standard” in favor of a subjective approach, in order to adequately 
protect the injured patient.111 The objective patient-based standard, 
although it was at that time the rule of the majority, has been criti-
cized by commentators arguing that a particular patient, after being 
given a proper disclosure of the risks, would have declined the 
therapy proposed, and a reasonable person in similar circumstances 
would have consented, then the patient’s right of self-
determination is “irrevocably lost.”112  
The merit of the subjective patient-based standard stands for 
the fact that it focuses on the particular needs of each patient, re-
quiring the physician to disclose the peculiar risks which that pa-
tient, in that position, in that moment would consider “material” 
for his decision to undergo the therapy.  
However, the subjective patient-base standard was criticized 
because it eliminated the protection (if any)113 that the physicians 
were benefiting from with regard to the objective standard, as the 
latter required them to disclose “only what a ‘reasonable’ patient 
would want to know.”114 Furthermore, it was contended that the 
subjective standard might preclude recovery for lack of proper dis-
closure if the patient died after the medical procedure was done.115 
Moreover, even if the subjective standard best reflects “the ethical 
and legal foundation”116 of the doctrine of informed consent, it 
fails because it lacks the certainty that physicians need to properly 
perform their tasks regarding the disclosure of the material risks.117 
How could the physician predict the information that the patient 
would consider relevant? However, because the physician is rarely 
able to anticipate the values and the preferences of the particular 
                                                                                                             
 111. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 443-44.  
 112. Scott, 606 P.2d at 559.  
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122 (Tenn. 1990)).  
 116. Id. at 445. 
 117. Id.  




patient, the law should not put such a burden on the practitioners of 
Hippocratic medicine.  
Does the subjective patient-based standard provide a better so-
lution to the hypothetical case that was exposed previously? The 
risk of having the finger’s mobility reduced, for Paul, a piano play-
er at the orchestra, is definitely a relevant one to be taken into con-
sideration when consent is given. Thus, under this standard, the 
patient would recover under the doctrine of informed consent for 
the physician’s failure to disclose the risk. However, if the physi-
cian is new in town and does not know and has no reasons to know 
that Paul is a piano player (and therefore, the risk is deemed to be 
material for the patient), should the law impose an omniscient 
knowledge on Dr. Medicus in order to protect the patient’s auton-
omy? We hold the opinion that the policy behind every law (where 
two different interests are conflicting) is to draw a proper balance 
in order to achieve a feasible solution. Nevertheless, how should 
this be done?  
II. THE STANDARD OF DISCLOSURE IN FRANCE  
Based on the ideas expressed by Portalis in a famous speech,118 
one may argue that changes in society, i.e., practice of medicine, 
should have an echo in the legal evolution and this should apply to 
the doctrine of informed consent.  
This part will focus on the country of good pastries and deli-
cious wine in order to illustrate how the “codified law”119 responds 
                                                                                                             
 118. Jean-Étienne-Marie Portalis, Discours préliminaire du premier projet de 
Code civil (2014), https://perma.cc/E3WB-ER57 (last visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
 119. Even if Anglo-American private law shows some repugnance with re-
spect to the concept of codification (see, e.g., Robert A. Pascal, A Summary Re-
flection on Legal Education, 69 LA. L. REV. 125, 133 (2008)), Simon Taylor 
stresses that “[c]odification of the patient’s rights to information in France 
should have a symbolic role in promoting the position of the patient in his rela-
tionship with the medical professional.” See also Simon Taylor, Cross-Border 
Patients and Informed Choices on Treatment in English and French Law and 
the Patient’s Rights Directive, 19 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW 467, 
474 (2012). On the other hand, the author mentions that this “symbolic and di-
dactic role for the patients” is much more difficult to see in English case law.  




(or not) to the needs of the contemporary society, i.e., the special 
relationship between the physician and the patient with respect to 
the standard of disclosure present in the doctrine of informed con-
sent.  
One may feel the need to establish the type of liability that the 
physician is held to in case he fails to perform the duty to disclose 
the necessary information to the patient. Considering this issue, the 
French law had an interesting development.  
To begin with, under French law, physicians were held liable 
under tort law (fault-based liability).120 Then, after the 1936 ruling 
of the Cour de Cassation in the famous case, Mercier,121 the medi-
cal malpractice liability, in the private sector, was viewed as a 
“matter of contract law.”122 Under this theory, the physician’s ob-
ligation was “not described as an obligation of result (obligation de 
résultat),”123 but as an obligation of means (obligation de moy-
ens).124 Thus, the physician had to comply with the Mercier test, 
which provides that the doctor must act with “attentive and consci-
entious care and, subject to exceptional circumstances, consistent 
with established scientific knowledge.”125 The practical distinction 
between the obligations of result126 and the obligation of means127 
                                                                                                             
 120. Florence G’Sell-Macrez, Medical Malpractice and Compensation in 
France. Part I: the French Rules of Medical Liability since the Patients’ Rights 
Law of March 4, 2002, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1093, 1096 (2011). By that time, 
physician’s liability was based on article 1382 of the French Civil Code. Article 
1382 is found in “Title IV. Obligations Arising Without Agreement, Chapter II. 
Delicts and Quasi-Delicts: Every act whatever of man that causes damage to 
another, obliges him by whose fault it occurred to repair it,” translated in 
Legifrance translations https://perma.cc/G9VV-5NN8 (last visited Apr. 1, 2016). 
 121. Cass. Civ. 1, 20 May 1936, D.P. I 1936, 1, 88 (concl. Matter, rapp. L. 
Josserand); GAZ. PAL. 1936, 2, 41 (note A. Besson). 
 122. G’Sell-Macrez, supra note 120, at 1096.  
 123. Olivier Moréteau, France, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2010 175, 177 
(Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds., de Gruyter 2010). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. This test was later enshrined in the Code de la Santé Publique [Pub-
lic Health Code] (Fr.) arts. R 4127-32 by Decree no. 2004-802 of July 29, 2004.  
 126. An obligation of result exists “whenever the performance or object of 
the performance is so precisely determined as to amount to a definite result to be 
achieved.” ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR ET AL., LOUISIANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: A 




is that, while in the first situation it suffices for the obligee (the pa-
tient) to prove that the result has not been attained, in the latter 
case, the patient has to show that the physician acted with negli-
gence, which is a more difficult burden of proof.128  
The analysis of the physician’s failure to inform the patient un-
der contractual theory of liability is not unknown to United States 
law. However, the courts hold that it is unlikely that the physicians 
will guarantee a certain result of a medical procedure,129 thus enter 
into a contract with the patients. Even so, there are cases in which 
the court found that a contractual link was created by the physi-
cian-patient relationship.130 Hence, the breach of the physician’s 
duty was treated as a breach of contract.131 
In 2010, the Cour de Cassation132 held the physician liable for 
failure to inform the patient based on article 16, 16-3 paragraph 2, 
and article 1382 of the Civil Code.133 Thus, it appears that the lia-
bility of the physician is based on tort law (article 1382, liability 
for fault), rather than on a contractual basis (which has been the 
rule since the Mercier case in 1936).134  
The impact of the 2010 revirement de jurisprudence (or over-
ruling) was thought not to have “a major practical conse-
quence.”135 In supporting this argument, it was contended that, ex-
cept for the prescription issues regarding bodily injury that have 
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MATERIALS 41 (Carolina Acad. Press 2013).  
 127. Id. An obligation of means or diligence can be defined as a situation 
“when an obligor is expected to use the best possible means available to him, or 
to act with outmost care and diligence in the performance of his obligation but 
without guaranteeing a definite result.”  
 128. HENRI MAZEAUD ET. AL., LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS 13-15 
(9th ed., Montchrestien 1998).  
 129. Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Mass. 1973). 
 130. Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 643 (N.H. 1929). 
 131. Id.  
 132. Cass. Civ. 1, 3 June 2010, Bull. Civ. I, no. 573; D. 2010, 1522 (note P. 
Sargos). 
 133. See English version, available at https://perma.cc/G9VV-5NN8 (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2016). 
 134. Moréteau, supra note 123, at 177.  
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already been eliminated under the Law of March 4, 2002 (also 
known as the Patients’ Rights Law136), the patient’s burden of 
proof did not change. Thus, the plaintiff still has to provide evi-
dence of the negligence on the part of the physician,137 similar to 
the situation in which the patient has to prove that the physician 
did not execute his contractual obligation of means.138 
A. What is the Legal Basis for the Duty to Inform? 
In France, the Civil Code “is phrased in the form of general 
rules”139 and special provisions can be found in other codes, such 
as the Public Health Code (Code de la santé publique) or statutes 
that cover specific areas of law. The “positive law,” meaning the 
law enacted by the legislature,140 should be seen in the view of ju-
risprudence.  
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. Loi 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des malades et à la 
qualité du systéme de santé [Law 2002-303 of March 4, 2002, on Patients’ 
Rights and the Quality of the Health System], [hereinafter the Patients’ Rights 
Law of March 4, 2002] which was incorporated into the Code de la Santé 
Publique [Public Health Code]. The law aimed at unifying the medical malprac-
tice liability rules, regardless if one party belongs to the private or to the public 
sector.  
 137. The question of causation as an element of the prima facie case of neg-
ligence can be posed differently in distinct civil law jurisdictions. For example, 
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have undergone the medical procedure had he known all possible risks and 
complications thereof. See Lüchinger, supra note 21, at 1, 29, 547, 579. This 
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France, the difficulty in establishing the causational link has been reduced by the 
French courts’ adoption of the notion of “loss of chance.” Taylor, supra note 
119, at 477-78. Actually, French courts have changed the notion of the injury in 
order to meet the standard of causation. Commentators of the French case, Cass. 
Civ. 1, 3 June 2010, supra note 132, seem to be uncertain of the need for the 
Supreme Court to award compensation for any failure to inform the patient (See, 
e.g., Patrice Jourdain, Le manquement au devoir d'information médicale cause 
un préjudice qui doit être réparé (revirement de jurisprudence), RTDCiv 2010, 
571, 573). 
 138. See supra note 126 for the definition of the obligation of result; see also 
supra note 127 for the definition of the obligation of means.  
 139. Olivier Moréteau, Codes as Straight-Jackets, Safeguards, and Alibis: 
The Experience of the French Civil Code, 20 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 273, 
274 (1995). 
 140. Id. at 276.  




 For the first time, the duty to inform was imposed on the phy-
sician by the Cour de Cassation in the Teyssier decision.141 The 
court stated that the physician has to, except for emergency cases, 
obtain an informed consent prior to the surgery.142 This duty is im-
posed in accordance with the respect given to the human being. If 
the physician violates the duty to disclose, he will be held liable.143  
In 2001, the Cour de Cassation144 held that the duty to inform 
the patient has its fundament in the requirement to respect the con-
stitutional principle of the human dignity.145 Even though the 
French Constitution does not contain expressis verbis the physi-
cian’s duty to disclosure, the principle of human dignity derives its 
constitutional value from the preamble’s reference to the Declara-
tion of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.146 
Moreover, article 16 of the Civil Code,147 states that the law in-
terdicts the infringement of the person’s dignity and guarantees 
respect for the human being from the beginning of his life.148 
                                                                                                             
 141. Cass. Civ. 1, 28 January 1942, D. 1942, 63. Teyssier, a professional 
driver, was injured in a car accident. At the hospital, he was diagnosed with a 
broken left hand. There were two surgical procedures to choose from: treatment 
by plaster cast and osteosynthesis. The latter operation was performed. The out-
come was not favorable to the patient, as he developed high fever and other 
complications which imposed the amputation of the hand. There was no breach 
with respect to the standard of care for the performance of the surgery. Howev-
er, the court held that the patient should have been informed about the conse-
quences of the surgery in order for him to be able to give his consent. Thus, the 
physician was held liable for the failure to provide the information necessary to 
the patient.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Cass. Civ. 1, 9 October 2001, Bull. Civ. I, no. 252; D. 2001, 3470 (note 
D. Thouvenin). 
 145. Pierre Sargos, Portée d’un revirement de jurisprudence au sujet de 
l’obligation d’information du médecin, D. 2001, 3470. 
 146. The Preamble of the 1958 French Constitution states that: “The French 
people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man and the princi-
ples of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789 . . .” translat-
ed in CONSTITUTION OF OCTOBER 4, 1958, https://perma.cc/HG2X-9JNL (Con-
seil constitutionnel) (last visited Mar. 6, 2016)).  
 147. This article did not exist at the time of Teyssier, as it was first enacted in 
1994. 
 148. C. CIV. art. 16 (Fr.), available at https://perma.cc/2BSW-2CXN (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2016). Article 16 is found in Book I of Persons, Title I of Civil 
Rights, Chapter II of the Respect of the Human Body and states the following: 




Additionally, article 16-3 of the Civil Code149 shows that the 
inviolability of the human body is not absolute. Thus, exceptions 
such as “in case of medical necessity for the person or exceptional-
ly in the therapeutic interest of others” may be regarded as legiti-
mate. However, because these are exceptions to the general rule 
presented in article 16, these situations have to be interpreted nar-
rowly. 
The presence of the people’s guarantees, both in the Constitu-
tion and in the Civil Code, shows the important role that the human 
being plays with respect to the legislation. Furthermore, it high-
lights that the physician cannot be confined to a technician role in 
which he just respects the rules of the medical field without any 
consideration regarding the patient.150   
B. The Patient’s Right to Information  
Even before the enactment of the Patients’ Rights Law, there 
was a jurisprudence constant,151 which imposed on physicians a 
heavy duty to inform the patient.152 In France, the patient’s right to 
information was given legislative value by the enactment of the 
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 150. François Villa, Comparaison des jurisprudences rendues en matière de 
responsabilité pour défaut d’information, MÉDICINE & DROIT 57, 60 (2013) 
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 152. Suzanne Carval & Ruth Sefton-Green, Medical Liability in France, in 
MEDICAL LIABILITY IN EUROPE: A COMPARISON OF SELECTED JURISDICTIONS, 
supra note 21, at 207, 213. 




Law of March 4, 2002. The principal elements of the 2002 law 
have been incorporated into the French Public Health Code. Art. 
L1111-2 paragraph 1 of the Public Health Code states that: 
Every person has the right to be informed of his state of 
health. This information relates to different investigations, 
treatment or preventive action which is proposed, its utility, 
possible urgency, the consequences, the frequent and seri-
ous risks that are normally foreseeable as well as other pos-
sible solutions and the foreseeable consequences in the 
event of refusal. Whenever new risks are identified, after 
the investigations, treatment or preventive actions have 
been carried out, the patient must be informed, except when 
it is impossible.153  
The Patients’ Right Law was an important event in the French 
legal history. This law has unified the medical malpractice rules in 
a civil law system that can be “portrayed as a very positive and 
legicentrist”154 one. To deeply understand the present law that is 
composed by multiple pieces that evolved over time, we have to 
take a careful look at the roots of the norms and the evolutionary 
background of the rules. One should not forget that the French tort 
law resides in the continual cooperation between scholars155 and 
the judiciary.156  
How important was the promulgation of the Patients’ Right 
Law? Did the law bring a totally new approach to the issue of in-
formed consent in France or just local remedies for the deficiencies 
that were noticed? Hereinafter, we will focus our attention on ana-
lyzing the law that was in force prior to March 4, 2002 and after-
wards.  
                                                                                                             
 153. See the following for the text in French, available at https://perma 
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C. The Duty to Disclose Before the Patients’ Rights Law of March 
4, 2002 
With regard to the means of presenting the information to the 
patient, the Cour de Cassation157 held that the physicians must 
give “a loyal, clear and appropriate”158 disclosure of the serious 
risks, in order to allow the patient to decide if he wants to undergo 
the medical procedure.159  
In 1998, the Cour de Cassation160 defined the scope of the 
physician’s duty to disclose. In that case, the person had a vertebral 
fracture caused by a fall.161 Because of the persistent pain, she un-
derwent surgery, which should have been followed by another.162 
In the afternoon, after the first surgery, the left eye had definitively 
lost its functionality.163 This risk was known to be very rare, so the 
physician did not inform the patient about it prior to surgery.164 
The patient filed a suit claiming, among other things, the failure of 
the physician to inform her about the rare risk of a definitive loss 
of an eye’s functionality.165 The Appellate Court dismissed the suit 
holding that the physician only had to disclose the normally fore-
seeable risks, and because the risk that occurred in this case was a 
very rare risk, the physician did not breach his duty by failing to 
inform the patient.166 However, the Cour de Cassation reversed 
this decision; it found that the physician did not meet his duty to 
disclose.167 In order to reach this conclusion, the Cour de Cassa-
tion held that the physician must inform the patient about the seri-
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ous risks of the investigations and the treatment proposed and that 
this duty exists even if the serious risks occur only in exceptional 
cases.168  
This leaves the question of what is the definition of a “serious 
risk.” The Cour de Cassation169 defined the serious risks170 as “the 
risk that might cause death, invalidity or serious aesthetic conse-
quences, considering their impact with respect to the physiological 
and social aspect of the patient’s life.”171 Moreover, if it is clear 
that a minor and exceptional risk is not required to be disclosed by 
the physician,172 one may wonder if there is a duty to disclose a 
minor risk that is foreseeable?  
Patrice Jourdain explains that, according to the Cour de Cassa-
tion, one must distinguish the serious risks, which must be dis-
closed, from the simple “inconvenience” of a medical procedure, 
which is not required to be disclosed.173 This is a fine line and Ad-
vocate General Sainte-Rose insisted that this theory of the excep-
tional risks must be reanalyzed.174 Thus, in 2002, the standard of 
disclosure was (re)defined by the legislature and encompassed in 
the Public Health Code. 
D. The Duty to Disclose After the Law of March 4, 2002  
The Patients’ Rights Law of March 4, 2002 relaxed the previ-
ous jurisprudential standard of disclosure175 in article L. 1111-2 
paragraph 1, which does not require the physician to provide ex-
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haustive information to the patient.176 Article L. 1111-2 paragraph 
1 imposes on the physician the obligation to inform the patient 
about the “frequent risks or the serious but normally predictable 
risks.”177 
With respect to the frequency of the risks, administrative courts 
in France held that even if a risk is not serious, if it can be regarded 
as frequent, then the physician has a duty to disclose it to the pa-
tient.178 Furthermore, there are cases that state that the physician’s 
duty to inform is not discharged if the risk is serious, even if it is 
not frequent.179  
One may note that there is no legislative definition of what ac-
tually constitutes “serious risks.”180 However, there are cases in 
which judges expressed their opinion on what constitutes a serious 
risk.181 A similar definition to the one adopted by the courts is giv-
en by the Haute Autorité de santé182 in its guide to physicians on 
what actually can be defined as serious risk183—“a serious harm184 
is one which is ‘life-threatening or that alters a vital bodily func-
tion.’”185  
The definitions that were attributed by the courts and govern-
mental entities to the serious risks would indicate that, in France, 
the standard of disclosure is an objective one. Compared to United 
States’ law, French law does not provide any solid indication 
whether the “seriousness” of the risk is to be treated from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable physician, a reasonable patient, or a par-
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ticular patient.186 It is thought that French lawyers feel more com-
fortable with the use of abstract principles than lawyers in common 
law.187 Thus, French society is less concerned to engage in a more 
detailed discussion about the type of standard of care that is im-
posed upon physicians.188  
In accordance with the legislative requirement that the risk has 
to be normally foreseeable, courts in France have ruled that a risk 
is “normalement prévisible,”189 even if it is exceptional, if it occurs 
in one case out of a thousand cases.190 Thus, statistical data plays 
an important role in the establishment of the foreseeability. More-
over, another factor that courts seemed to have taken into consid-
eration is the health antecedent of the patient.191 
Going back to the hypothetical situation that was presented 
above, one may argue that the risk of loss of the finger’s mobility 
is not a serious risk from an objective point of view and, more 
probable than not, this risk is not frequent. However, if the physi-
cian had known about the pianistic activity of the patient (i.e., he 
had attended the local orchestra in the past or the patient himself 
had disclosed this information to the health care provider), then it 
is likely that the risk of stiffness of the finger would be regarded as 
serious. This risk affects “the social aspect of the patient’s life.”192 
Thus, more probable than not, the physician would be found liable 
for the failure to disclose this serious risk to the patient, as he had 
knowledge of the patient’s lifestyle and preferences.  
A common law scholar may point a finger at the lack the fore-
seeability on what type of risks are serious and/or frequent and 
normally foreseeable. He might also object that decisions of 
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French courts use brief and cryptic language and it might be only 
after the work of a scholar that the entire decision is fully under-
stood. Hence, the physician’s duty and the extent of the patient’s 
right to information may seem to him unclear and ambiguous.  
III. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS  
The legal standards in the United States and in France have un-
dergone impressive improvements with respect to the patient’s 
right to self-determination in the sphere of the doctrine of informed 
consent. However, there are still areas in which the solutions pro-
vided by the law do not correspond to the need of the parties in-
volved, i.e., the physician and the patient. For example, in most 
jurisdictions in the United States the standard of disclosure does 
not depend upon the lifestyle of the patient, though he is the one 
who has to consent to the medical procedure, unless the patient 
brings his preferences to the physician’s knowledge. However, 
generally, the reasonable prudent practitioner or the reasonable pa-
tient is taken into consideration to establish the physician’s duty to 
disclose.  
A proper legal standard of informed consent should aim at pro-
tecting the patient’s ability to obtain the information necessary for 
making an intelligent decision, to either decide for him or to defer 
the decision-making to the physician. Moreover, the ideal legal 
standard should provide the physician with a clear understanding 
of what necessary information should be disclosed to the particular 
patient in order to avoid liability based on the doctrine of informed 
consent. One may ask whether the law in the common law as well 
as in the civil law arena could achieve such goals. This part of the 
paper will prove that this desideratum is not utopic.  
The next part will propose, without aiming to achieve an ex-
haustive analysis, two possible alternative solutions193: the modifi-
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cation of the substantive patient-based standard developed by the 
courts in the United States and the implementation of a new stand-
ard of care, known as the shared medical decision-making.  
A. Injecting Objectiveness into the Substantive Patient-Based 
Standard 
In the United States, the subjective patient-based standard194 
adopted by the court in Scott v. Bradford195 has been vigorously 
criticized because, among other objections, it was contended that it 
eliminated the protection given by the objective standard to the 
physician, as the latter standard required the physician to disclose 
the information deemed relevant to a “reasonable patient.”196 In 
order to overcome this criticism, one may ask whether, by fusing 
different legal concepts, the law might find a solution that will 
consist of the combination between the objective and the subjec-
tive standard. However, is it worth the effort? How many jurisdic-
tions worldwide have implemented the subjective patient-based 
standard?  
The United States subjective approach of the doctrine of in-
formed consent can be identified, though under different names, in 
many other jurisdictions such as Belgium, Germany, or Switzer-
land.197  
In Belgium, the traditional standard of informed consent, which 
stated that the physician must inform the patient about the “normal 
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and foreseeable”198 risks, has been criticized for being “too vague 
and too abstract.”199 The more modern standard, so-called the “rel-
evant-risk”200 theory has been implicitly accepted by the Cour de 
Cassation of Belgium.201 Under this theory, the physician has to 
disclose to the patient the risks that are considered relevant for “the 
patient in a particular case.”202 Thus, in Belgium, the United States 
subjective patient-based standard has been implemented since 
2009.  
The law in Germany with respect to the standard of disclosure 
is based on the principle of full disclosure.203 German law empha-
sizes on the patient’s right to self-determination.204 Hence, it was 
stated that “the decisive element here is the view of the specific 
patient in the specific situation, not the view of a ‘reasonable pa-
tient.’”205 Therefore, it is evident that Germany has adopted the 
subjective patient-based standard without specifically naming it as 
such.  
Switzerland is another example where in order for the patient 
to give his intelligent consent to a medical procedure, he should be 
provided with all the necessary information.206 With respect to the 
standard of disclosure, Swiss law emphasizes that the “individual 
patient’s information needs are decisive, not those of a ‘reasonable 
patient.’”207 Hence, Switzerland is an additional jurisdiction in 
which the subjective patient-based standard seems to be effective.  
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It was contended, in France, that the standard of disclosure is 
more likely treated as objective. However, even though there may 
be no clear guidelines as to whether the standard of disclosure is 
treated from the viewpoint of a reasonable physician, a reasonable 
patient, or a particular patient,208 it is important to notice that, in 
1997, the Cour de Cassation showed great concern for the pa-
tient’s physiological and social aspects.209 Thus, from this point of 
view, the French standard of disclosure may be regarded as a fu-
sion of the American objective and subjective standard. Therefore, 
important steps have been taken in order for the law to evolve ac-
cordingly to the changing needs of society. Are these steps 
enough? Does the law fully satisfy the evolutionary sociological 
aspects of life?   
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned references to 
different jurisdictions that seem to have adopted the United States 
subjective patient-based standard and that major criticism that was 
brought to this standard (the elimination of the physician’s protec-
tion given by the objective standard), one may argue that injecting 
some objectiveness into the subjective standard might be a solution 
to the issue. Essentially, this means that the new “mixed” standard 
should require the physician to disclose the relevant information to 
the particular patient (not to a reasonable patient, as the objective 
standard requires), if the obligor of the duty to inform (i.e., the 
physician) knows or should have reasonably known that the special 
risk is important to the patient. 
The structure of the “mixed” standard seems similar to the re-
quirements of error, as a vice of consent.210 For a definition of er-
ror, article 1949 of the Louisiana Civil Code states the following: 
“Error vitiates consent only when it concerns a cause without 
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which the obligation would not have been incurred and that cause 
was known or should have been known to the other party.”211 
In order to properly examine the issue of error, it is mandatory 
to determine the notion and the legal effects of consent: “[c]onsent, 
which is the concurrence of the declared will of parties to an 
agreement, constitutes an essential element of contract in both the 
civil and the common law.”212 Consent given in order to enter into 
a contract can be vitiated by error, thus the contract is annulla-
ble.213 In the United States, as well as in France, the physician’s 
liability for failure to disclose the relevant information to the pa-
tient is based on tort law. Thus, the notion of error, as a vice of 
consent, is inapplicable. However, because we are discussing con-
sent, the provisions of error can be implemented by analogy in the 
field of defining the duty to disclose in the doctrine of informed 
consent.  
The “mixed” standard is not totally unknown to United States 
case law. For example, in 1980, a California court in Truman v. 
Thomas214 held that “if the physician knows or should know of a 
patient's unique concerns or lack of familiarity with medical pro-
cedures, this may expand the scope of required disclosure.”215 
However, by using the word “may,”216 the court seemed to be re-
luctant to hold this as a mandatory requirement imposed upon the 
duty to disclose, but it shows that the idea of injecting subjectivity 
into the objective standard may be a practicable solution.217  
By adopting a “mixed” standard, both in the United States and 
in France or in any other jurisdiction that implemented the subjec-
tive patient-based standard, the goals of the doctrine of informed 
                                                                                                             
 211. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1949. 
 212. Herbert A. Holstein, Vices of Consent in the Law of Contracts, 13 TUL. 
L. REV. 362 (1938).  
 213. Id. at 364.  
 214. Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980).  
 215. Id. at 906.  
 216. The use of the word “must,” for example, would have given a more au-
thoritative tone to the rationale. 
 217. However, this case was decided by applying the objective standard.  




consent are better achieved by applying the actual objective or sub-
jective patient-based standard. Thus, the right of self-determination 
of the patient is well protected because he is given the information 
regarding the risk that he, as an individual, deems important. 
Moreover, the physician is protected by the law as, in case he does 
not know or has no reasonable reasons to know that the risk is im-
portant to the patient, he will not be held liable for the failure to 
disclose such risk. This might imply, on the part of the patient, a 
duty to communicate his preferences and values so that the physi-
cian is under the legal obligation to disclose the risks associated 
with the patient’s lifestyle. However, no obligation to inform the 
physician should be imposed on the patient. It should be rather left 
at his discretion and if the patient chooses not to inform the physi-
cian about his preferences and values, then the consequence will be 
that the physician cannot be held liable under the doctrine of in-
formed consent for the failure to disclose the peculiar risks associ-
ated with the medical procedure.  
How does the “mixed” standard work in the hypothetical sce-
nario previously mentioned? The discussion should start by analyz-
ing whether the physician knew or had reasons to know the pa-
tient’s values and preferences (i.e., the fact that he plays the piano, 
hence his fingers’ mobility is very important aspect of his life-
style). If Dr. Medicus knew because the patient told him about his 
piano passion or had reasons to know because, for example, Paul is 
famous in town for his piano performances, then the risk of nerve 
damage should have been disclosed to the patient. In the event that 
Dr. Medicus does not disclose the material risk and if the other el-
ements of the action under the doctrine of informed consent are 
met, then the physician will be held liable. If, under the circum-
stances, the physician was unaware of the values and preferences 
of the patient, then the physician is not going to be held liable for 
the failure to disclose the risk of nerve damage.  
In conclusion, even if implementing the “mixed” standard re-
quires more profound research and analysis, from a general point 




of view, it seems to be a feasible standard that achieves the goals 
of the doctrine of informed consent better than the actual stand-
ards. Apart from the “mixed” standard of disclosure, recently, in 
the legal and medical field, a new standard of care started to 
evolve, in which both the physician and the patient are protago-
nists.  
B. Shared Medical Decision-Making  
The current legal standards of disclosure in the United States 
and in France can be visually associated to a one-way road, in 
which the physician provides the patient with the information that 
a reasonable physician would disclose,218 or a reasonable patient 
would consider material,219 or the particular patient would deem 
important220 in making the decision to undergo a medical proce-
dure. Nevertheless, one may ask why does the information go just 
one way? Why should the patient be deprived of the possibility to 
provide the physician with individual concerns or questions,221 or 
emotional preferences, if the patient desires to do so?222 The theory 
that pleads for a two-way “alley” of exchanged information is 
known as the shared medical decision-making.223  
A possible definition of the shared medical decision-making is 
described as followed: “a process in which the physician shares 
with the patient all relevant risk and benefit information on all 
treatment alternatives and the patient shares with the physician all 
relevant personal information that might make one treatment or 
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side effect more or less tolerable than others.”224 Thereafter, both 
parties use the information gathered from the interaction to come 
to a mutual medical decision.225 
According to the definition of informed consent, one may view 
the process as consisting of three main steps.226 Firstly, the physi-
cian provides accurate and useful information regarding the option 
of treatment to the patient and then, the latter shares his prefer-
ences and values.227 Secondly, the physician and the patient en-
gage in a process of shared medical decision-making.228 Thirdly, 
the two parties involved in the medical relationship will decide to-
gether the best option that fits the needs of the patient.229  
To begin with, as people differ in their level of medical litera-
cy, level of risk aversion, values, and preferences, etc.,230 they 
have to be assisted in clearly identifying whether they deem a spe-
cific risk important, so they want that risk to be disclosed by the 
physician.  
Two different methods—decision aids and decision coach-
es231—have been proposed to assist the patients through the deci-
sion process by providing them with the adequate information and 
helping them discover their preferences and values.232 Firstly, the 
purpose of a decision aid is to “analyze the latest clinical evidence 
regarding the risks and benefits of different treatment options and 
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then present the information in a manner patients understand.”233 
Thus, the patient will be given the information regarding the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each medical option that is available 
to him in an unbiased manner.234 Secondly, the patient might be 
assisted in making the medical decisions by decision coaches.235 
These individuals help the patient identify the values and the pref-
erences in the medical treatment, so that the patient will be able to 
have a meaningful conversation with the physician, later in the 
process.236 Thus, this phase takes place before the patient’s meet-
ing with the physician.237  
Not every medical institution has the financial means to resort 
to decision aids and decision coaches and that they are not availa-
ble for every major medical decision.238 However, scholars have 
argued that, while preferable, decision aids are not essential to the 
implementation of shared medical decision-making, as there are 
other resources that provide physicians with the needed up-to-date 
information.239 
The physician and the patient should together “construct a care 
space.”240 Hence, the two actors should engage in a consultation, 
during which the patient’s treatment preferences together with the 
physician’s medical opinion will be mutually exchanged. This in-
teraction can be described as a two-way street, where the infor-
mation flows from both the physician and the patient. For example, 
in the Netherlands, the patient has the duty to communicate his 
preferences and values to the physician, as he “‘needs to do the 
best to his knowledge’ to inform the practitioner and cooperate 
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with him in as far as is reasonable needed for his treatment.”241 
However, one may highlight that no obligation to disclose should 
be imposed to the patient, as the requirement to provide personal 
information conflicts with his right to privacy.242 Hence, the pa-
tient’s rights to keep silence with respect to his preferences and 
values should be respected.243 Nonetheless, in case the patient’s 
desire is to communicate his particular situation to the physician, 
except for the fact that such possibility should be provided by the 
law, the patient should also be provided with aid244 in order to 
properly identify his preferences and values. 
Generally, there is mistrust on the part of physicians because 
they fear that patients might feel anxious after the information is 
provided.245 Moreover, the literature contends that there is little in 
the physicians’ medical training and experience that could prepare 
them to “sense how patients will react to disclosures.”246 Thus, the 
summary report that is done after the first step of the process helps 
the physician to identify the suitable level of disclosure with re-
spect to the patient’s needs and his physical comfort.247  
There are four possible outcomes with respect to the possibility 
to reach an agreement between the physician and the patient re-
garding the medical procedure to be undertaken. First, the parties 
arrive at a mutual medical decision.248 Second, the patient chooses 
to undergo a specific procedure, with which the physician disa-
grees, but he will provide nonetheless.249 Third, no agreement is 
reached, so the patient seeks medical care elsewhere.250 Fourth, the 
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patient can choose to differ the treatment choice to the physi-
cian.251 Whichever conclusion is going to be drawn, it is more like-
ly that the medical procedure chosen will be adequate for the pa-
tient’s individual values and preferences and the physician will not 
be held liable for the failure to provide the relevant information in 
order to allow the patient to make an intelligent decision. 
At the end of the discussion, the physician will provide a con-
sent form for the patient to sign that acknowledges that the parties 
successfully engaged in shared medical decision-making and, fi-
nally, reached a conclusion regarding the medical procedure.252  
The value of the consent form has been discussed in many ju-
risdictions. For example, in Italy, the jurisprudence held that the 
duty to inform is not “a mere ‘bureaucratic step,’”253 as the pa-
tient’s consent has to be expressed based on comprehensible in-
formation.254 Moreover, in England, the British Medical Associa-
tion “tool kit” underlines the importance of the discussion with the 
patient and emphasizes that the written consent form should be 
seen as a supplement to rather than a substitute of the dialog.255 
Scholars have identified a set of benefits of shared medical de-
cision-making.256 Firstly, from the patient’s standpoint, shared 
medical decision-making enhances his autonomy, as it satisfies the 
need for adequate information and engagement in the medical dis-
cussion.257 Studies have shown that “the vast majority of patients 
want to be informed and involved in medical decision-making.”258 
However, there is no evidence that the patient strongly desires to 
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remove annihilate the physician’s integral part of the medical deci-
sions.259 Thus, after receiving the information that the patient 
wants, he has the possibility to determine whether he will defer the 
decision entirely to the physician or make a final determination 
with the collaboration of the physician.260 Moreover, various stud-
ies have shown that by increasing the patient’s involvement in the 
medical decision-making, he will reach psychological comfort, 
which will contribute to the patient’s well-being.261 Furthermore, 
some studies have shown that the involvement of the patients in 
medical decisions has improved the treatment outcomes.262 
Secondly, from the physician’s point of view, shared medical 
decision-making will provide insights on what the patient’s prefer-
ences and values need to be taken into consideration when the dis-
closure is given.263 Thus, the law will give a clearer standard of 
disclosure. In addition, the physician’s medical liability should be 
heavily reduced because of the extensive communication with the 
patient and the better perception of goals.264 Moreover, the ample 
discussions in which the physician and the patient engage will 
tighten the bonds between them. Thus, less stress is placed on the 
medical professional when he performs the chosen procedure.265 
 Skeptics, who have spoken against the potential benefits of the 
shared medical decision-making, argue that the implementation of 
such standard raises important challenges.266  
Firstly, the management of the physician’s time seems to be 
one of the major concerns.267 It has been contended that physicians 
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do not have the time to explain every detail to patients.268 These 
obstacles are not insurmountable.269 For example, by adopting de-
cision aids, or other decision management tools, such as a decision 
coach, the physician will save a lot of time. Thus, the physician 
will not be required to gather and provide information to the pa-
tient, in order for the latter to be able to engage in a productive 
communication.270 Even if there is definitely an “initial time in-
vestment”271 designed to favor the training of physicians to proper-
ly take part in shared medical decision-making, this investment 
will profit in the long run by reducing the overall time needed for 
the delivery of information.272 
Secondly, it has been contended that even if physicians had the 
time to properly engage in shared medical decision-making, they 
are not paid for the time spent discussing the risks with patients.273 
Moreover, implementing shared medical decision-making may re-
sult in “a reduction in medical services as many patients would 
forego care if they had all the facts.”274 Thus, physicians will be 
rewarded with less financial support because of fewer treatment 
requests.275 However, engaging in shared medical decision-making 
will potentially lower the number of malpractice claims, as it is 
more probable than not that this standard of disclosure will be a 
solution to the communication difficulties that physicians and pa-
tients face.276 
In conclusion, despite the criticism that might be brought to the 
idea of adopting shared medical decision-making as a standard of 
disclosure in the United States and France, there is definitely a 
                                                                                                             
 268. Id.  
 269. Id.  
 270. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 473. 
 271. Id.  
 272. Id. 
 273. Moulton & King, supra note 223, at 90. 
 274. King & Moulton, supra note 11, at 474.  
 275. Id.  
 276. The communication defects in the relationship between the physician 
and the patient are said to be among the most common complaints from patients 
who sue physicians for malpractice. Id. 




need to adapt the actual legal standards of disclosure, in both juris-
dictions, to meet society’s demands. The robust mechanism of this 
innovative idea may be the best, if not perfect, compromise be-
tween the patient’s autonomy277 and the physician’s expertise and 
beneficence.278  
Back to our leading hypothetical, under the shared medical de-
cision-making, the patient would have had the opportunity to dis-
cuss the medical procedure in depth with the physician and ask 
questions relating to it during the first two steps of the process. 
Hence, Paul would have had the possibility to identify and share 
his values and preferences with Dr. Medicus (i.e., the fact that he 
plays the piano, hence his finger’s mobility is very important to his 
lifestyle). The risk of nerve damage would have ultimately been 
disclosed to the patient. Therefore, Paul would have been able to 
give a proper informed consent to the medical procedure (whether 
he ultimately decides to undergo surgery or not). Although, Paul’s 
preferences are unlikely to be shared by other patients, it is not im-
possible that some of them feel the same way. Dr. Medicus should 
nevertheless express his opinion regarding the treatment that best 
fits with the personal values of the patient. If, for instance, the phy-
sician has a strong preference for a certain procedure (the surgery, 
for example), which is not consented by the patient, Dr. Medicus 
has no authority to force Paul to undergo treatment. On the other 
hand, if under the same scenario, Paul is aware of the possible risk 
of nerve damage and consents to the surgery, he would give an in-
formed consent. He would be prepared psychologically for the un-
likely result that might occur and could not claim damages for the 
physician’s failure to inform him about the risk.  
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To conclude, by implementing shared medical decision-making 
in the United States and France, the cases in which physicians 
would be held liable for failure to disclose risks to patients would 
be substantially reduced and the patient’s autonomy would be pro-
tected against any illegal intrusion.  
CONCLUSION 
It takes a global view to properly understand the duty to dis-
close imposed on the physician by the doctrine of informed con-
sent. This paper covers a common law jurisdiction, the United 
States, and a civil law jurisdiction, France, while offering cross-
references to other jurisdictions.  
Firstly, in the United States, in case the patient gives his con-
sent to the medical procedure, but he is not sufficiently informed 
beforehand, there are two lines of cases addressing the scope of the 
physician’s duty to disclose the risks intrinsic to the procedure: the 
professional standard and the prudent patient-based standard. The 
latter is divided into two sub standards: the objective and the sub-
jective patient-based standard. The professional standard deter-
mines the physician’s duty by asking: what would a reasonable 
physician disclose to a patient under similar circumstances? The 
approach differs under the patient-based standard that establishes 
the duty to disclose by referring to the needs of a reasonable pa-
tient (under the objective approach), or by referring to the individ-
ual patient (as the subjective substandard requires).  
Secondly, in France, the Cour de cassation held that the duty to 
inform the patient has its fundament in the requirement to respect 
the constitutional principle of human dignity. Moreover, the pa-
tient’s right to information was reinforced by the enactment of the 
Law of March 4, 2002. Thus, each individual has the right to be 
informed about “the frequent and serious risks”279 that are “nor-
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mally predictable.”280 With respect to the definition given by 
courts and governmental entities to the serious risks would indicate 
that, in France, the standard of disclosure is an objective one, alt-
hough there is no profound analysis on this matter.281 It was con-
tended that French lawyers are more at ease with the use of ab-
stract principles than common law lawyers. 
Criticisms have been brought to the actual standards of disclo-
sure. Skeptics claim that under the professional standard, the phy-
sician is given discretion as the information process is regarded as 
a question of professional judgment. Moreover, it was contemplat-
ed that the objective patient-based standard assumes that all pa-
tients assess similarly the risks and benefits of a medical proce-
dure, thus the right to self-determination is not protected. Further-
more, critique was brought to the subjective patient-based standard 
because it eliminates the protection given to physicians by the ob-
jective standard. Hence, the general inference is that the standard 
of disclosure, i.e., the duty to inform, does not respect the “modern 
medical practice”282 and the “individual autonomy rights”283 of 
patients. 
Keeping in mind that the principles of medical ethics (autono-
my, beneficence, non-malfeasance and justice)284 and human rights 
(patient’s ability to exercise self-determination) should guide the 
legal development of the doctrine of informed consent,285 this pa-
per proposed, in a non-exhaustive manner, the addition of two al-
ternative legal standards of disclosure.  
Firstly, in order to overcome the criticism that the subjective 
patient-based standard does not adequately protect the physician 
from unwanted liability, embracing into tort law the content of the 
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notion of error, as a vice of consent, might be a feasible solution. 
Thus, the new “mixed” standard should require the physician to 
disclose the relevant information to the particular patient (not to a 
reasonable patient, as the objective standard requires), if the obli-
gor of the duty to inform, i.e., the physician, knows or should have 
reasonably known that the special risk is important to the patient. 
This standard has the advantage that the right of self-determination 
of the patient is respected, as he is given personalized information. 
Moreover, the law protects the physician: in case he does not know 
or has no reasonable reasons to know that the risk is important to 
the patient, he will not be held liable for the failure to disclose such 
risk. 
Secondly, implementing a new standard, known as the shared 
medical decision-making, may be a key to achieve the goals of the 
doctrine of informed consent. The shared medical decision-
making, by engaging both the physician and the patient in the pro-
cess of deciding on the medical treatment or procedure, makes 
possible the communication of patient’s treatment preferences, on 
the one hand, and the physician’s medical opinion, on the other 
hand. Hence, from the patient’s standpoint, shared medical deci-
sion-making enhances his autonomy, satisfies his need of adequate 
information and engagement in the medical discussion. From the 
physician’s point of view, shared medical decision-making will 
provide an understanding on what are the values and the prefer-
ences of the patient. The physician will then be able to disclose the 
relevant information to the particular patient and avoid unlimited 
liability for the failure to disclose the material risks.  
The deficiencies found in United States law and in French law 
may be solved by applying, as an incremental step towards reach-
ing the goals of the doctrine of informed consent, the “mixed” 
standard of disclosure. Meanwhile, the legal and economic frame-
work of the countries will be able to implement the medical and 
legal national infrastructure to adopt properly and successfully 
shared medical decision-making.  




We hope that this analysis provides lawmakers the legal arena 
with useful insights. While being careful to not swing the pendu-
lum too far in favor of either party (i.e., the patient or the physi-
cian), we believe that more in depth research ought to be undertak-
en in order for the proposed alternative standards of disclosure to 
be integrated into different legal systems across the world. 
 
 
 
 
